Nov 7. Baghdad Darling Father. This week has been comparatively uneventful. The Cabinet met for the first time on Tuesday but it doesn't seem to have done much except discuss what would be the relations between the ministers and their advisers, and finally to resolve to ask Sir Percy to explain. He has gone into the whole matter very carefully to the Naqib, on the basis of an excellent memorandum drawn up by Mr Philby, and I believe he meets the Cabinet tomorrow. After the Cabinet meeting the Naqib sent for Fahad Beg and asked whether he would be prepared to take a message from the Cabinet to the insurgent tribes. Fahad came hot foot in to me: "Khatun" he said "you I know and Kokus I know, but of Arab governments I have no knowledge. Neither will I give any answer to the Naqib till I am assured that Kokus would approve." I brought in Mr Philby and together we reassured him. "Oh Khatun" said he "oh Feelbi, on your heads you tell me that Kokus would approve?" And he was so much perturbed that he came in the following day and said he hadn't been able to sleep for fear of doing anything contrary to the policy of Kokus. I couldn't help feeling that with such staunch allies as Fahad there was little fear that the influence of Kokus would not avail! However, Fahad need not have bothered for as yet no request to send an embassy to the tribes has come in from the Cabinet. And if they delay much longer the matter will probably be settled by other methods. For the chiefs of the Euphrates are tumbling over one another to make submission. The last coming is 'Abdul Wahid of the Fatlah, with whom we lunched. This is the result of British arms not of native institutions and on the whole I think the quelling of the reBellion is better done by force than by persuasion. But our tether is very short. Already India is clamouring for the return of the divisions she lent us. Very soon the force won't be here. We must therefore do the best we can; patch up matters and leave them to the Arab Govt to settle. Tribal lawlessness, consequent on the tribal revolt, the Arab Govt will undoubtedly inherit and my own belief is that they (and we behind them) will be able to do very little towards orderly administration of the Euphrates between Kufah [Kufah, Al] and Samawah [Samawah, As]. We shall not be able to retain the necessary troops; the Arab Govt will have none at all - for the moment and the tribes will have it pretty much their own way. And in the end they will have got what they fought for, namely a chaotic local independence; but the rest of the country will suffer for it. All this shows how infinitely regrettable it is that political discontent was allowed to grow till it reached reBellion. If we had been setting up native institutions in the midst of order instead of in the midst of disorder, the task would have been incomparably easier. I hear that Ja'far, whom I haven't seen this week, is having a hard tussle with the Arab officers of the Turkish army who did not join Faisal's army. They are solidly pro-Turk and refuse to help in forming a National Arab army because they maintain that the Turk must inevitably return. Their argument is that no power has ever kept Mesopotamia unless it held the passes to the north, notably the Cilician Gates, and as the Turks still hold these, back they must come. It's amazingly bad history for neither the Babylonians, nor the Assyrians, nor the Seleucids, Parthians and Arab Khalifs ever held the northern passes, but it has just enough strategic truth in it to impress people. I believe (learning from experience) that if we had been wise we should not have insisted on the destruction of Turkish overlordship. We should have set up an autonomous Arab state here, under nominal Turkish suzerainty with British advice and help, thus preserving the Turkish cadre, which would have saved us many difficulties. But - it's done, and it would have been hard at the date of the armistice to have done otherwise. For we all thought that Arab liberties were our true goal, not only here but also in Syria and Palestine. In which we've been proved to be wrong, witness the Syria and Palestine of today. Apart from the pro-Turks, of which there are numbers, the Naqib's Council has against it almost the whole body of Shi'ahs, partly because it's looked upon as of British parentage, but also because it contains considerably less Shi'ah's than Sunnis. The Shi'ahs, as I've often observed, are one of the greatest problems. They never under the Turks took part in administration; consequently there are no men among them who have the shadowyest [sic] acquaintance with public affairs. And their leading people, the learned divines and their families are all Persian subjects. I find that the best argument when people come to me and complain that Mirza Saiyid so-and-so has not been included in the Cabinet. "Effendim, may I ask whether he is a subject of the Mesopotamian state?" "Effendim, no; he is a subject of Persia." Then I point out that in that case he can't hold office in a Mesopotamian Govt and none of my interlocutors have found an answer. For there is none. But it's typical of the muddle headedness not to have realized the crux. I attempt to give you the picture so that you may realize the problem; it's true that few are pleased, but they wouldn't have been pleased with any line whatsoever. I honestly believe that Sir Percy has chosen the best possible path, the only one which could have led to any kind of settlement. But it won't lead to immediate peace and contentment. That's not possible. As soon as we can we must proceed to the election of a National Assembly, no matter how inadequately and even farcical the election may be. And I shall be very much mistaken (but then I often am) if they don't ask for a son of the Sharif as an Amir. I regard that as the only solution. The Naqib himself is a respectable head of the State, but he is a very sick man. His sons are one and all worthless. Even in Baghdad, where the moral tone is negligible, they are noted for personal depravity. In the East relations with women don't count, but there are one or two things which Islam can't openly wink at, and boys and wine are among them. Our friend Muhi ud Din is one of the worst offenders in these respects. It's revolting, but it's true. Now Faisal, at any rate (I know nothing about 'Abdullah) is a man of exceptionally high moral character. I had one small adventure this week. I was riding in the evening and my pony, being rather mad from want of regular excercise [sic], took fright at a lot of dogs which were barking at mine, and attempted to negotiate a barbed wire fence, quite unsuccessfully. We came off, however, much better than might have been expected, for I was thrown clear of the barbed wire and not hurt at all, while the pony was only scratched and cut a little and is now quite well. Nov 8 [8 November 1920] On Sunday, ie yesterday, Capt Clayton and I went out to lunch with Hasan Suhail at Aqar Quf. We sent on horses, picked them up on the Fallujah [Fallujah, Al] road and cantered across to the camp which is now a good 3 miles west of where it was when you saw it. There we had an excellent lunch and a long talk about public opinion, on which Hasan is always interesting. He is a strong tribesman and a strong Shi'ah and very eager to get both interests well represented. Sir Percy motored out in the afternoon to some cultivation near by to shoot sand grouse, but we didn't stay for we had a good 15 miles' ride home and in fact we got in long after dark. It was most pleasant spending the whole day out in the desert. Last week I got letters from you and Mother both dated Sep 29 and today one from you of Oct 8. I was rather perturbed to hear that you had had a fever and very glad you are better. I'm particularly sorry that Arthur is still not well - I do hope your next news of him will be better. And thank you, dearest, for your long letter of Oct 8 about the Asquith letter. The incident is now closed, but all you did and didn't do was absolutely right. Your very affectionate daughter Gertrude I think this will reach you about Xmas time and many many greetings to all the party at home. This is rather a dull letter I'm sorry to say [Note on back of envelope] Mother's letter of Oct 6 just arrived