Monday Sep 29. [29 September 1919] Temp. something over 80?. General Clayton came to lunch. He says that the rly strike in England comes at a very unfortunate moment for Egypt as there is a growing feeling, strongly flavoured with Italian sicialistic intrigue and supported by the Nationalist party, for syndicalism. If the threat of boycott with which the Milner commission is menaced becomes more pronounced, he doubts the wisdom of dispatching the Commission. It would mean that most of the important people would refuse to give evidence while the waverers would [be] terrorized into withholding it and those who persisted would earn popular denunciation for having given it. The decisions of the Commission would therefore be discredited from the first as having been based on insufficient data. Moreover a boycott would certainly be accompanied by 4 days' strikes in all the public services a tour de role which would not only be practically very inconvenient, but would also reflect upon the position of the Commission during the course of its work. It seems likely that the boycott will take place; the Egyptians refuse to have anything to do with it on the ground that they have sent their representatives to Paris and entrusted them with their views, which they will give to no others. General Clayton interviewed the Egyptian delegation before it left. The case they made was a very strong one. They said we had come here with the declared intention of remaining only till we had restored tranquility to the country. These declarations had been renewed repeatedly, but at longer and longer intervals, which as time went on it became clear that far from educating the natives of the country to govern themselves, we employed an ever growing number of Englishmen in the smaller administrative posts. At the same time they would admit that we had been of great benefit to the country. At the outbreak of war the old link with Turkey was broken without any consultation with Egyptian feeling. Nevertheless Egyptians, satisified that the Allies were fighting for the smaller nationalities, had raised no protest. In our first proclamation we declared that we would take all the burden of the war upon ourselves, but Egypt found herself obliged to provision our armies and provide labour corps both inside and outside the country. The Egyptian government had {without any pressure} spontaneously contributed £4000000 to war expenses. The trade of the country had suffered and prices had risen. Then came the enunciation of principles favourable to Egyptian independence, Wilson's 14 points, warmly adhered to by Lloyd George, and much talk of self determination. Acting on the principles to which we had given utterance, the Egyptians had asked to be allowed to send a deputation to London to expose their views. The request was refused on the ground that H.M.G. had not time to listen to the deputation, though it was supported by the High Commissioner. When it was persisted in, the deputies were imprisoned. It would be impossible to maintain that they were not representative of the country. Sa'ad Zaghlul was Vice President of the {Council} Legislative Assembly which is chosen by an elected body, several others were members of the {Council} Assembly, and all had held high official posts of one kind or other. Clayton said that while it was possible to pick holes in details of the argument, substantially it held good. In his view our object should now be to guard a. Imperial necessities in Egypt, b. international interests for which we had made ourselves responsible, and let all the rest go. We must maintain control of the Suez Canal, the Nile water (leaving the details of irrigation in native hands with a general British supervision) the army and the police. He would leave the Egyptian ministers without British advisers, but give the High Commissioner a British adviser in each department with a general supervision over the department but without executive powers. No doubt the Egyptians would make grave mistakes and tie the departments into serious knots; but they have the right, as they claim, to a fair trial and to be given the opportunity of showing whether they cannot learn from their own mistakes. Concessions on these lines would, he thinks, win the majority of the country to our side; immediate prejudice apart, they do not wish for any outside assistance except from us and do not believe that they can stand without ours. If however we refuse to take very bold liberal measures we shall create in Egypt an Oriental Ireland. As far as his knowledge goes, he would advise us in Mesopotamia to begin as we intend to go on, so as to avoid the position which has arisen in Egypt. However poor our material, he would create independent Arab ministries with departmental advisers to the High Commissioner. The ministers could form an [sic] Council with an Arab President without portfolio who would partly be occupied by social duties and who might easily be developed into a permanent head of the state. Meantime the sovereignty of the state would be vested in the Council. As for justice, the capitulations are at present in suspense here. He does not wish for their renewal and hopes that some other means may be found to protect foreign rights. The revision of the Code has been interrupted by the war and is still far from completion. It is a very long and delicate business.\n\nWe then went to the Savoy to see Sir Louis Bowes who was out and Col. Meinetzhagen [i.e. Meinertzhagen] with whom Gen. Clayton left me. After making a general scheme for my journey, he told me that the Syrian question was still in the melting pot. A telegram received yesterday from Lord Curzon said that no decision had been reached. Apparently Faisal in London has caused H.M.G. to hesitate over the conclusions reached in Paris. Col. M. attributes the change partly to a telegram despatched by him on the 17th describing a conversation between Faisal the French and himself in Damascus [Dimashq (Esh Sham, Damas)]. Faisal definitely declined to accept a French mandate on the ground that the Arabs would be enslaved. Asked if he would agree if Palestine were to be added to Syria under a French mandate, he again refused. Col. M. and Major Clayton in Damascus both feel certain that the withdrawal of our troops from the Arab province - to which Lord Allenby told me it was not intended to send French troops - would be followed immediately or shortly by a massacre of the Christians. Col. M. thinks that when the French take on the coastal district, some act of oppression on their part towards an Arab - and this he is persuaded will occur - will set the Arabs aflame and lead to massacre in the Arab province. It is to be noticed that he is far more pessimistic than Lord Allenby and moreover that he is still convinced that the French will not be able to carry out their intentions and, I think, that in the last resort we shall put pressure on the French. \n\nWe then discussed the interchange of intelligence. It is obvious why the Arab Bureau has failed to discharge the functions we required of it. Being under the High Commissioner it has nothing to do with Allenby's force, and Palestine and Syria fall entirely outside its sphere. Nor are any of the communications we send to it passed on to the Allenby's P.O. Col. M. said that a freer exchange of telegrams between him and Col. Wilson was much to be desired. I suggested that we both wanted far more than that; that even if our administration information were not of value to him or the 4 departments under him, Palestine, Damascus, Beirut [Beyrouth] and Cilicia, our political news was of concern to him, and that, for our part both administrative and political details would be welcomed. Would it not be possible for him to appoint an officer to collect and forward it? He replied that it would be of far greater value to him if Col. Wilson would appoint an officer here to tour in Palestine and Syria and send up exactly what was needed, but he was visibly discountenanced when I said that owing to the lack of personnel the officer, if appointed, might be myself. He still maintained that no other scheme would meet his views and added that he could not himself spare an officer for the job. I then asked whether the P.O.s under him did not send him administrative reports and if so, might we have them. He said there was no reason against that but that much of them would be Greek to us. I said we should still like to have them and we would make what we could of them. Nothing has been printed, so that we could not have the back numbers. He added that there was a periodical political report which he thought would be of value to us and which he would send us. He would like in future copies of our Arbur papers, but it would be as well to withhold purely administrative matters, such as the monthly roll of appointments, in which he would take no interest. If we sent all we issue, he would be swamped under it and would probably pay no attention to any. \n\nSaiyid Talib with his two younger sons 'Ali and Ahmad, came to see me at 9 p.m. and stayed till 11. He is younger than I expected, thin, with an eager expression, not the least a swash buckler in appearance, cunning rather than dissipated. Gen. Clayton however says that his health is much impaired and that he is subject to frequent illnesses. He gave us the whole story of his life and times, skating delicately over certain portions. He declared that now that the Turk was beaten he would serve us as faithfully as he served them (sic!). He wishes to send his two younger sons and the two sons of his secretary 'Umar back to Basrah [Basrah, Al (Basra)] immediately. His two elder sons are to remain at a college at Alexandria where they are being educated. He himself wants to return to Basrah and pursue the life of a country gentleman cultivating his estates - of which to the best of my recollection, he has none. I replied that no doubt after the peace with Turkey was concluded the matter would be considered by Sir Percy Cox. I do not see that we could permanently oppose his return nor would there be any obvious reason for doing it. He enquired anxiously as to the capacity of the younger members of the family of the Naqib of Baghdad and I do not doubt that he was thinking of them as possible rivals to himself as candidates for the position of Amir.